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COMMENTS
PRIVITY; PROPERTY DAMAGE; AND PERSONAL
INJURIES ... A RE-APPRAISAL
MALCOLM L. EDWARDS
... it appears that a realistic, judicial analysis and reappraisal of the
privity rule would be quite appropriate.'
The responsibility of a vendor of personal property to persons
other than his immediate vendee has troubled courts throughout our
legal history.' The primary purpose of this comment is to analyze
this liability for personal injuries or property damage in an action for
breach of warranty. The inquiry is strictly limited to those obligations
which arise incidentally to a sale or contract to sell personal property.
It does not extend to sales of realty or to those transactions which
are not sales, such as service contracts and contracts of bailment. The
discussion is further limited to the vendor's liability for personal
injuries and property damage and does not include liability for the
invasion of intangible economic interests. The comment is not con-
cerned with causes of action other than breaches of warranty, such as
causes of action sounding in negligence or fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions. The discussion will be devoted to the existing law in Washington,
and a summary with emphasis of possible future developments4
THE EXISTING LAW IN WASIaiNGTON
The extent to which a vendor of personal property is liable to
persons other than his immediate vendee for personal injuries or
property damage is not clear under the Washington law. The
relevant statute in this area is the Uniform Sales Act. It was
adopted in Washington in 1925.5 The language used in the sections
devoted to warranties' is that of "buyer" and "seller" and "sale" and
"contract of sale." This has been interpreted as meaning the Act
IFreeman v. Navarre, 47 Wn2d 760, 767, 289 P2d 1015, 1019 (1955).
2 PROSSER, TORTS § 86 (2nd ed. 1955).
3 The area of law relating to the invasion of intangible economic interests is suffi-
ciently broad to merit a comment directed to that subject alone.
The comment includes all of the relevant cases disclosed by the author's research
in an attempt to give the subject an exhaustive treatment.
5 RCW 63.04.
6 RCW 63.04.120 through .170.
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regulates only the rights and duties of a "buyer" and "seller" who
are parties or privies to the same "contract of sale" or "sale."' Such
a construction should mean that a discussion of the law relating to the
liability of a vendor to persons other than his immediate vendee need
not concern itself with the Uniform Sales Act.' However, the court
has developed certain fictions to bring problems in this area under
the purview of the Act, namely: by finding a contract relationship
under a broadened definition of agency9 or by calling the injured party
a third party beneficiary of the original sale.10
Those cases decided prior to the passage of the Act in 1925, and
subsequent cases which do not rest on a finding of privity, must be
based on the common law. The mere fact that the Sales Act does not
regulate the rights and duties between a vendor and persons not in
privity does not indicate a legislative intent to limit the vendor's
liability solely to parties in privity. Section 73" indicates that the ven-
dor's liability in this area is governed by the common law. It provides
that, "In any case not provided for in this Act, the rules of law and
equity, including the law merchant... shall continue to apply .. 11
Washington cases give verbal support to the general common law
rule of no liability without privity. Appended to this general rule are
several so called exceptions. 2 The surprising thing is that there is
little authority to support the general rule. There is more positive
authority for the general rule in actions based on implied warranty
than in actions based on express warranty. Because of this possible
difference in treatment by the court, they will be discussed separately
in this comment.'
Express Warranty
None of the Washington cases, on their facts, support the often
stated general rule that privity is required to maintain an action
based on express warranty. The most noted case in this area is Baxter
v. Ford Motor Company,' decided in 1932. In that case, the plaintiff
7 Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn.2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
8 Uniform Sales Act, supra note 5.
9 Freeman v. Navarre, supra note 1.
lo Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wn2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952).
"1 RCW 63.04.740.
12 Mazetti v. Armour, 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
18 Warranties of title are primarily concerned with invasions of intangible eco-
nomic interests and are not discussed in this comment. To the effect that privity is a
requirement in this area, see Peregrine v. West Seattle State Bank, 120 Wash. 653,
208 Pac. 35 (1922).
14168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 412 aff'd 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
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purchased a new car from a dealer after reading circulars put out
by the defendant manufacturer representing the windshield of the
car to be shatterproof. The contract between the plaintiff and the
dealer contained a disclaimer clause. Shortly after purchasing the
car, the windshield shattered under a slight impact causing injury to
one of the plaintiff's eyes. The court paid verbal homage to the privity
requirement but went on to allow recovery against the defendant on
the theory the statements in the circular were express warranties. In
so doing, the court stated:
It would seem unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manu-
facturers of goods to create a demand for their products by represent-
ing that they possess qualities, which they, in fact, do not possess; and
then, because there is no privity of contract existing between the con-
sumer and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to recover
if damages result from the absence of those qualities, when such ab-
sence is not readily noticeable.15
This case would seem to indicate that privity is not a requirement in
an action for breach of an express warranty based on statements of
fact contained in a manufacturer's advertisements as to a consumer
who in justifiable reliance thereon purchases the product in the
ordinary course of trade. 6
The court, in later cases, has departed from the frank approach
to the problem demonstrated in the Baxter case, supra. As a substitute
recovery has been granted by finding a fictional contractual relation-
ship between the parties. The most recent illustration of this is Free-
man v. Navarre,"' decided in 1955. The owner of the proposed Belle-
vue Shopping Square hired an architect to plan the development. An
agent of the manufacturer of "Ric-Will" pipe represented to a
mechanical engineer, hired by the architect, that their underground
heating pipe had a long and trouble-free life. The engineer specified
in the contract that "Ric-Will" pipe was to be used. Navarre Plumb-
ing and Heating was awarded the mechanical contract and purchased
and installed the pipe as per the specifications. The pipe proved to
be defective and the owner of the project was allowed to recover
against the manufacturer of the pipe on theory that privity existed.
I" Ibid at p. 462.16 Sholley, Manufacturer's Advertisements as Express Warranty to Consumer, 7
WAsH. L. REv. 351 (1932); But cf. Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wn.2d 190,
170 P.2d 642 (1950), which refers to the case as resting on fraud. Notice that there
was no proof of negligence or knowledge of the defect on the part of the defendant.
But cf. Fleenor v. Erickson, 35 Wn.2d 891, 215 P2d 885 (1950), where the court
referred to the Baxter case as an extension of the warranty doctrine.
2747 Wn.2d 760, 289 P2d 1015 (1955).
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The court said that the contractor was the agent of the owner for the
purpose of the purchase of the pipe. This appears to be an obvious
fiction as the owner lacked the requisite degree of control over the
contractor's performance of the job. A contractor of this sort should
be classified as an "independent contractor" and not an agent. His
function is to do a job for a price to meet the specifications. The
existence of this contractual relationship does not give the contractor
authority to enter into contracts binding the owner of the project."'
A common rule of agency is that if an agent enters into a contract
of purchase on behalf of his principal, whether or not the principal
is disclosed, the seller of the goods may sue the principal for the pur-
chase price." Clearly, the manufacturer of the "Ric-Will" pipe would
not have been very successful in an attempt to hold the owner of the
shopping square personally liable for the purchase price of the pipe.
True, the seller may have been able to exert a materialmen's lien"0
against the subject matter of the contract. However, the exertion of
the lien does not hold the owner personally liable. The seller's only
claim is against the property upon which the lien is exerted.2
The advisability of making the agency argument in cases of this
type has been illustrated in previous decisions of the court. In Wisdom
v. Morris Hardware Co.,2" an apple orchard owner told the defendant
hardware store that he and his neighbors were having a great deal
of trouble with aphids. The defendant sold him a spray which he rep-
resented would solve the problem without injuring the trees. The
owner told the defendant that if the spray worked he could probably
sell a lot of it to other orchard owners in the valley. The defendant
gave the owner some literature describing the product. Upon return-
ing to the valley, the owner told four of his neighbors what the defend-
ant had said and showed them the literature. Two of the neighbors
purchased some of the product from the defendant. Two others
ordered the product on credit from a produce store in an adjacent
town. The spray damaged the trees and all five parties brought suit
against the defendant. All five recovered. The court found privity
on the basis that the owner was the agent of the defendant for the
purpose of conveying the representations to the four neighbors. As
to the owner and two of the neighbors who purchased the product
IS MECEm, AGENCY § 14 (4th ed. 1952).
19 Ibid at § 15.
20 RCW 60.04.010.
21 Ibid.
22 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1928).
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from the defendant, the court had little difficulty. The court had a
greater problem as to the two neighbors who purchased from the
produce store. Surmounting the problem, the court held the produce
store was the agent of the two plaintiff's for the purchase of the prod-
uct because the produce store advanced them credit.23 Query: could
the hardware store hold these two plaintiff's personally liable for the
purchase price of the product?
A 1952 decision 4 of our court points out another possible avenue
of escaping the professed privity rule. In this case, A told B he had
a buyer for a caterpillar tractor. Both A and B were vendors of used
equipment. B found that C had a caterpillar and both discussed it with
A, in which discussion both B and C assured A that the caterpillar
would be warranted as 90% new and never used in salt water. B con-
firmed this conversation by sending a notarized statement to A. B
purchased the tractor from C and sold it to A who sold it to D. D
returned the tractor after it broke down. The court allowed A to
recover against C on the theory that A was an intended beneficiary in
the contract of sale between B and C.
Three Washington cases have denied recovery in this area. In each of
them the court stated that there can be no recovery without privity of
contract. The cases could have and might have been decided on alter-
native grounds. The first of these was Kramer v. Carbolineum Wood
Preserving Co."- In this case, the plaintiff purchased a chemical prod-
uct to kill fruit tree borers from A store. The label on the can repre-
sented that the chemical would kill borers and make fruit trees health-
ier. At a later date, the plaintiff purchased the same product from B
store sans label. The second purchase was applied and it damaged
the plaintiff's trees. The court denied recovery against the distributor
who allegedly sold both cans to the different stores. The court pointed
out that there was no proof that the defendant had sold either of the
cans to either of the two stores. In such a case, no liability would result
even if privity were not a requirement. The cause of action failed for
lack of a casual relationship between the defendant's conduct and the
damage suffered by the plaintiff. If decided on privity alone, it may
demonstrate a reluctance of the court to hold liable a distributor who
has no control over the production of the product.
The second case in which recovery was denied was Cochran v.
23 Cf. Ingraham v. Associated Oil Company, 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 645 (1932).
24 Jeffery v. Hanson, supra note 10.
"5 105 Wash. 401, 177 Pac. 771 (1919).
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McDonald.26 The plaintiff purchased a can of anti-freeze, the use
of which damaged his car. The can bore a label placed upon it by
the manufacturer, representing the product as safe for use in automo-
biles. The service station from which the plaintiff purchased the anti-
freeze purchased it from a distributor who purchased it from the
manufacturer. The court refused to hold the distributor liable. The
case does not necessarily support the privity rule. The court pointed
out an alternative ground for the decision, namely that the distributor
did not adopt the warranty on the label by the mere act of selling it
to a retailer for resale to the ultimate consumers." The third case,
Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co.,' could have been decided on the
alternative grounds that the subject matter of the sale was realty and
the representations which allegedly gave rise to the express warranty
were made after the purchase. In this case, the plaintiff, after pur-
chasing a house, read a circular describing the furnace which the
builder had purchased and installed in the home. The furnace smoked
and did not supply adequate heat. The court denied recovery against
the manufacturer."
Each of the above three cases can be said to stand for the rule that
privity is required for an action based on breach of an express war-
ranty. However, the statement of the privity rule can be relegated
to the realm of dictum by use of the analysis set out above. One
approach appears to be as reasonable as the other. Therefore, our
court stands in the unique position of being able to overrule the sup-
posed general rule without overruling a single Washington case.
Implied Warranties
There is more positive authority for the privity requirement in an
action for breach of an implied warranty. The leading case in this
area is Mazetti v. Armour,"0 decided in 1913. The court gave a res-
taurant lessee recovery against a food manufacturer, not in privity
with the plaintiff, for loss of profits occasioned by serving unwhole-
some tongue to a verbose customer. The case arose on a demurrer
to a complaint alleging negligence and breach of an implied warranty.
The court discussed both causes of action in a somewhat unrelated
manner and held that recovery should be allowed under one theory
26 Cochran v. McDonald, supra note 7.
27 Cf. Jolly v. Blackwell and Co., 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1942).
28 25 Wn.2d 190, 170 P2d 642 (1946).
20 The court also pointed out the furnace was not fautly. The fault was in the
installation.
so 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
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or another. In discussing the warranty aspect of the case, the court
stated that privity was required with certain exceptions. The stated
exceptions were:
(1) Where the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous
kind; (2) where the defendant has been guilty of fraud or deceit in
passing off the article; (and) (3) where the defendant has been negli-
gent in some respect with reference to the sale or construction of a
thing not imminently dangerous.3'
It would appear that exceptions (2) and (3) are not really exceptions
at all. They are causes of action other than breach of warranty.
Exception (2), "where the defendant has been guilty of fraud or
deceit in passing off the article," states a cause of action based on
fraudulent misrepresentations, and exception (3) states a cause of
action based on negligence. Nevertheless, this passage which con-
fuses alternative remedies has been repeated in dictum in nearly every
subsequent case which has dealt with the problem.2
Apart from the cases involving food, there is no authority for excep-
tion (1), "Where the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dan-
gerous kind." In the food cases, the court apparently feels that the
possibility of harm from defective food products is so great that the
consumer must be protected by imposing absolute liability on the
vendor. It is significant to note that this first case allowed recovery
for invasion of an intangible economic interest-loss of profits-not
for bodily harm to the consumer of the food. A subsequent case has
allowed recovery for personal injuries occasioned by eating unwhole-
some food,3 where the court held a dairy liable for breach of an
implied warranty to an ultimate consumer who purchased the milk
from the owner of a dairy route. The court indicated that the farmer
who sold the milk to the dairy would be liable except for the plaintiff's
failure to prove that the milk he consumed came from his farm.
In a more recent case, Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 4 recovery
would have been granted against the canner of certain salmon pur-
chased by the plaintiff from a retailer if the plaintiff had successfully
proven that her sickness was caused by the unwholesome character of
the fish. The above cases seem to support the rule that a vendor of food
products impliedly warrants their wholesomeness "to all who may be
31 Ibid at p. 624.
32 See all of the remaining cases cited in this portion of the comment.
-3 Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wn2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940).
"3 16 Vn2d 1, 132 P2d 740 (1942).
25 Mazetti v. Armour, supra note 12 at p. 630.
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damaged by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of trade."))5
Recovery has been denied in an action for breach of an implied war-
ranty in three cases where the subject matter of the sale was not food.
Cochran v. McDonald, supra, discussed in the express warranty sec-
tion, seems to squarely support the general rule that privity is required
to maintain an action based on implied warranty. The two remaining
cases also mentioned the rule requiring privity, but each could have
been decided on other grounds. As pointed out previously, in Dobbin
v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., supra, the subject matter of the sale was
realty and the evidence did not support the plaintiff's contention that
the furnace was defective. In Fleenor v. Erickson, supra, the defect
was in the installation of the insulating material without providing for
ventilation between the floor upon which the material was placed and
the ground beneath it. Theoretically an implied warranty can cover
defects in installation. Section 15 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act"
states, "Where the buyer.., makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required... there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
However, in this case, it did not appear that the manufacturer of the
insulating material was ever informed of the absence of ventilation
between the floor and the ground. Therefore, he did not impliedly
warrant that it would be fit for the particular purpose or application
intended by the plaintiff. There is also the additional factor that the
plaintiff had purchased the material before talking to the agent of the
manufacturer. The above analysis indicates that the court can aban-
don the privity requirement in implied warranties by overruling but
one case, namely the Cochran case, supra.
SUmmARY: POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The Washington lawyer representing an injured plaintiff not in
privity with the defendant is faced with two possible courses of action.
He may ground his claim for relief on the Uniform Sales Act. In that
event the attorney must exercise his imagination and find the existence
of privity on some fictional basis such as the agency or third party
beneficiary method. The court has accepted this approach in express
warranty cases and would quite probably accept it for implied war-
ranties in a proper case. As a second approach the lawyer may admit
the lack of privity and base his claim on the common law. He should
be successful on either express or implied warranty if the subject
36 RCW 63.04.160 (1).
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matter of the sale is food, or if the facts fall within the express war-
ranty doctrine of the Baxter case, supra. The court may be suscept-
ible to an attempt to bring cases within the dictum of exception (1) in
the Mazetti case, supra: namely where "the thing causing the injury
is of a noxious or dangerous kind.. .". Under either of the two pos-
sible approaches, the plaintiff will have a greater chance of recovering
if the defendant is a manufacturer or, in some other manner, exercises
some degree of control in the production or packaging of the subject
matter of the sale.
Unfortunately, the law is in such a state of confusion that the
plaintiff may have to appeal to gain a favorable judgment. This
is an expensive process and is prohibitive in many cases where the
amount in dispute is not large. The moral of the story may be that
a vendor can, without any substantial risk, place products in the
channels of commerce which might injure many people a little, but not
those which might injure a few people a substantial amount. The use
of fictions tends to increase the law's uncertainty and the consequent
necessity of appeal. If the court is in basic disagreement with the
privity requirement, it would appear they would be rendering a public
service by frankly stating this disagreement and overruling the often
stated general rule.
The court has recently indicated a willingness to re-examine the
privity requirement." Such a re-examination should include an inquiry
into both the legal and substantive factors surrounding the rule. As
previously pointed out, the court can negate the Washington authority
for the rule requiring privity in the area of express warranty without
overruling a single case, and in the area of implied warranty by over-
uling but one decision.
There are strong historical legal grounds for overruling this case.
The rule was derived by a confusion of writ and right. The early
English cases in this area were sued out of the writ, trespass on the
case, and were regarded as tort actions." Due to the use of the writ
of assumpsit in later cases,3 all warranty obligations came to be
regarded as contractual in nature. Later courts improperly allowed
the writ to control the right and held that there could be no recovery
in a tort action where the wrong was also a breach of contract unless
37 Freeman v. Navarre, supra note 1 at p. 765.3S Fitz Ab Monst de Faits, pl. 160 (1383); Cf WmLmSTOx, SALES § 195 (rev. ed.
1948) to the effect that the law of warranty is one hundred years older than the writ
of special assumpsit.
3" Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18 (1778).
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there was a contractual relationship between the parties."
Authority can be found for abandoning the professed general rule
in warranty actions by reference to the growth of negligence law.
Privity of contract was once a requirement in negligence actions where
the tort was also a breach of contract. Early courts carved out an
exception to the rule where the subject matter of the sale was inher-
ently dangerous. After a losing struggle to define satisfactorily what
was "inherently dangerous," Justice Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,4  wrote an illuminating opinion in which he stated, "If the
nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is a thing of danger." It was
just a short step from this statement to the rule which now prevails in
Washington and in the majority of the states, namely: an injured
party may recover against a vendor-tortfeasor in a negligence action,
despite the lack of a contractual relationship between the parties,
provided all the elements necessary to constitute a cause of action
are alleged and proved." The one-time "inherently dangerous" negli-
gence exception is strikingly similar to the present Washington "nox-
ious or dangerous" warranty exception stated in the Mazetti case,
supra. This similarity of growth provides analagous authority for
overruling the rule requiring privity in warranty actions.
The most common objection to overruling the privity requirement
is that, by so doing, the court would be usurping the power of the
legislature. This objection overlooks the fact that the history of the
common law is a history of change to cope with the problems pre-
sented by the changing world. The abandonment of the privity
requirement in negligence actions was accomplished by judicial deci-
sion and not by legislative decree. As early as 1913, our own court
recognized the legitimate power of the courts to modify the existing
law to meet new problems. In so doing, the court stated, "An excep-
tion to a rule will be declared by courts when the case is not an
isolated instance, but general in its character and the existing rule
does not square with justice." ' The privity requirement was born
in an age where the consumer dealt directly with the manufacturer on
a personal basis. Since that time we have had a significant change in
4 0 Langridge v. Levy, 2 M & W 519 (1837), affirmed 4 M & W 338; Earl v. Lub-
back, 1 K.B. 253 (1905).
41217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 2 Freeman v. Navarre, supra note 1; Bock v. Truck and Tractor Inc., 18 NVn.2d
458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943).
43 Mazetti v. Armour, supra note 12 at p. 629.
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business methods with attendant "... mass production, large scale or
national promotion, and distribution..."" of products. The enormity
of this change should exempt the court from any charges of usurpation
of legislative power should it decide to abandon the privity require-
ment in warranty actions.
The change in business methods also makes it exceedingly difficult,
if not impossible in many cases, to prove negligence." In many in-
stances the alleged negligent act may have occurred thousands of
miles from the place where the injury was sustained. The method of
proving negligence is generally by the use of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor. To recover under this doctrine, one must show that the defect
was one which usually does not occur without negligence on the part
of the defendant. The plaintiff must exclude the possibility that the
accident was due to the misconduct of intermediate handlers and
meddling third persons. The practical difficulties of obtaining evidence
as to the history of the product after it has left the defendant's hands
are sufficient to make recovery practically impossible in many cases.4"
The extension of the vendor's liability on a breach of warranty to
persons not in privity need not result in unlimited liability. A test
similar to the one applied in negligence cases could be utilized to hold
the ambit of the vendor's responsibility within reasonable bounds.
Substituted for the privity requirement would be the "proximate
cause" test or the more predictable test of whether a reasonable vendor
could have foreseen a possibility of the harm which resulted." Under
existing law, a vendor may be held responsible to persons other than
his immediate vendee. It is generally held that a vendee who has
purchased goods with a warranty may recover damages he has been
compelled to pay a subpurchaser to whom the goods were resold with
a similar warranty.48 In one English case" there was a series of five
recoveries with the manufacturer ultimately paying the consumer's
damage plus the costs of all the litigation." Substitution of the test
of foreseeability for the privity test should eliminate this needless
increase of the cost of administering the judicial system and release
money for other activity more worthwhile to society.
44 Freeman v. Navarre, supra note 1.
46 PRssmR, TORTS § 88 at p. 505 (2nd ed. 1955).
46 Ibid.
47 Note Manufacturers' and Vendors' Liability Without Fault to Persons Other
Than Their Immediate Vendees, 33 CoLum. L. REv. 868 (1933).
48 WILLISTON, SALs § 244 (rev. ed. 1948).4 ) Kasler and Cohen v. Slavouski, 1 K-B. 78, 96 L.J.K.B. 850 (1928).
ro Intervening insolvency or lack of liability can stop tis chain reaction. WLLisToN,
SALES op cit. supra note 48.
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Perhaps the most convincing reason for abandoning the privity
requirement is the vendor's greater ability to distribute the risk of
loss. Justice Holmes has said:"
Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized
wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like, where the damages might be
taken to lie where they fell by legal judgment. But the torts with
which our courts are kept busy today are mainly the incidents of cer-
tain well known businesses.
This comment would appear to be as appropriate today as it was
when made in 1897. Shouldn't the vendor bear the expenses of injury
to persons other than his immediate vendee as he does other expenses
incidental to the sale of his products? It is submitted that the con-
flicting social interests of the vendor and persons who come into
contact with his product can best be balanced by placing liability on
the vendor for the foreseeable risks created within the scope of the
warranty obligation. The vendor can transfer this risk to an insur-
ance company 2 or act as a self-insurer. In either event, the cost of
so doing will be reflected by a negligible increase in the cost of the
goods sold, and the ultimate risk will be distributed to all those who
are benefited by purchasing the product.
If our court is willing to examine the privity question as an original
proposition, it is believed that the legal and substantive factors set out
above will lead to an abandonment of the rule requiring privity be-
tween the parties to an action based on breach of warranty. The
author concurs in the belief that "... a realistic, judicial analysis and
reappraisal of the privity rule would be quite appropriate.""
51 Hohnes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
52 "The business of writing such insurance (against tort liability) is not a new one.
It has been practiced for more than a half century; its routines are familiar to thou-
sands whose livelihood it supplies." Gardner, Insurace Against Tort Liability-An
Approach to the Cosmology of the Law, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 455 (1950).
53 Freeman v. Navarre, supra note 1.
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